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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper investigates whether market information could add to accounting information in 
the prediction of bank financial distress in Asia. A stepwise logit model is first estimated to 
isolate the optimal set of accounting indicators and then extended to include market 
indicators. Dummy variables are also introduced in the model to account for the possible 
existence of balance sheet structure effects. Our results show that market indicators bring in 
additional information in the prediction process and this contribution holds whatever the 
importance of the ratio of market funded liabilities over total assets. We also find that market 
indicators are significant to predict banks' financial distress whatever assets structure. 
However, for non traditional banks, that is for banks with a low ratio of net loans to total 
assets, market information seems difficult to interpret.  
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1. Introduction  
Given the major role played by banks as intermediaries in the financial system, it is essential 
that supervisors assess banks’ financial health on a frequent basis. To predict banks’ financial 
situation, early warning systems (EWS) have been designed but most models mainly focus on 
accounting data which are backward looking. Moreover, the reliability of accounting data has 
always been questioned given the very persistent issues of information quality and diversity in 
the application of accounting principles.1 As a result, users of financial information also look 
into other available information that could aid them in making more informed decisions. 
Market data are considered as a viable complement to accounting information in the conduct 
of assessing bank financial health. Thus, the use of market data is more and more considered 
to enhance the supervisory process (Berger, Davies, and Flannery [2000], Flannery [1998]). 
 
Several studies have been conducted to determine if market information can complete 
accounting information to predict banks' financial health. In the US case, Curry, Elmer, and 
Fissel [2007] and Evanoff and Wall [2001] show that the use of market indicators improves 
the assessment of banks financial health. It is also the case in Europe. Indeed, Gropp, Vesala 
and Vulpes [2006] and Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi [2006] show that market indicators add to 
the predictive power of accounting indicators and that they can predict deteriorations in 
banks’ financial condition at relatively long horizons.  
 
With the occurrence of the Asian Crisis, there was heightened interest in the role of the 
banking sector in Asian economies especially since most studies in this area pinpoint 
particular weaknesses in the sector which aggravated the crisis. However, in the Asian case, 
little has been written on the prediction of banks' financial degradations since most studies 
focus on early-warning models of banking crises (Demirgüc-Kunt and Degatriache, [2000]). 
  
The objective of this paper is to determine if, in the Asian banking sector, equity market 
information can complete accounting information to predict banks' financial distress. The 
paper also looks into the reliability and stability of market indicators given the presence of 
balance sheet structure effects. Indeed, it may be more difficult for market participants to 
                                                 
1
 Users of financial information are on the alert with respect to the quality of accounting information since 
management (the company) has the incentive to “select” generally accepted accounting principles that could 
favorably present financial performance. On the other hand, the development and adoption of International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) aim to eliminate diversity and country differences in the application of accounting 
principles. 
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assess the financial health of banks heavily involved in loan activities as they are supposed to 
be more opaque (Diamond, 1984). By contrast, banks heavily relying on market funding may 
be more accurately scrutinized by the market. Using eight Asian countries as a point of study, 
this paper also aims to further investigate potential differences between banks from the tiger 
economies and banks from emerging markets. 
   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology adopted for our study. 
Section 3 describes the data and the set of early accounting and market indicators used in our 
estimations. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
The main purpose of this study is to determine if equity market indicators can bring in 
information not yet contained in accounting data to predict bank financial distress. In order to 
do this, a stepwise process is employed which initially solely considers the set of accounting 
indicators for the prediction model. The process is later on extended to include a large set of 
market indicators to determine the marginal contribution of these indicators in the prediction 
process. Then, to test the existence of balance sheet structure effects, dummy variables are 
introduced. Thus, we determine the effect of balance sheet structure on the effectiveness of 
the selected market indicators.  
 
To begin with, we need to determine an event that could represent a change in the financial 
situation of a bank. Studies conducted in the US mainly use explicit bank failures or 
supervisory ratings downgrades as in Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2007], Kolari, and al. [2002] 
and Gunther, Levonian, and Moore [2001]. In the European case, sharp downgrades (Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes [2006]) are used as proxies for actual bank failure or downgrade 
announcements by private rating agencies2 (Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi [2006]) as proxies 
for financial distress. In Asia, there have been only few actual bank failures. Thus, in this 
paper, following Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi [2006], we consider downgrading 
announcements from the three major rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s 
to represent deteriorations in the bank’s financial condition.  
 
                                                 
2
 Due to confidentiality laws in most countries, it is difficult to gain access to explicit supervisory ratings in 
Europe. 
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Accounting Cji and market Mli indicators are computed to estimate the probability of a 
downgrade. However, accounting and market data are not available at the same frequencies. 
As such, the starting point for this study is December 31st of each year - when accounting 
information is available. Events taking place during the following calendar year are then 
considered, which avoids the interpolation of missing accounting data and ensures that the 
information content of accounting data is not inappropriately upward biased. 
 
For each bank in the sample, the dependent variable Y is equal to:  
 1, if the bank is downgraded by at least one rating agency with no upgrading taking 
place during the entire calendar year and no downgrade or upgrade during the last 
quarter of the preceding year;  
 0, if the rating remains unaltered or if the bank experienced an upgrade during the 
calendar year; and; 
 NA (not available), for all other cases.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the definition of the dependent variable Y (0, 1, NA). 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
 
 
As in Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi [2006], the following logit model is employed to estimate 
the probability of a downgrade: 
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where Cji and Mli are the jth accounting indicator and the lth market indicator, respectively, 
and ( ).Φ  denotes the cumulated logistic distribution function. Maximum likelihood estimators 
of the coefficients ( )lj γβα ,,  are used and robust Huber-White covariance matrix estimation 
allows for possible misspecification of the error term distribution. 
 
In the selection of the optimal predictors of bank financial distress, only the predictive power 
of the accounting indicators is considered first. The best indicators are selected through a 
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stepwise process.3 The procedure is then extended to include market indicators in order to 
determine their marginal contribution to the prediction model. Market indicators are added to 
the optimal subset of accounting indicators obtained in the first step. 
 
However, due to the possible existence of balance sheet structure effects, there is a need to 
test for the stability of the contribution of market indicators in the prediction process. This is 
tested in the model through the inclusion of dummy variables. We also conduct estimations of 
the different models on restricted samples of banks. 
 
3. Sample and Indicators 
 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of 64 banks from Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. These banks are regularly listed in their home 
countries and are rated by at least one of the three rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s.   
 
The banks are categorized into two groups A and B. The bank is classified as group A, if it is 
from Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan or Singapore; then group B, if from Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia or the Philippines. It is more prudent to group the banks into country categories as 
the two country groups exhibit different characteristics particularly with respect to the level of 
development of their financial system.   
Table 1 presents the distribution of banks by country and specialization for the combined 
groups A and B, group A and group B. Information is taken from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 
Accounting data come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA and weekly market data are obtained 
from Datastream International. In order to avoid noise related to the 1997 financial crisis, we 
                                                 
3
 As a rule of thumb, a 10% level for type 1 error is retained and a Max (Min) LR statistic is used as a criterion 
for adding (ruling out) each potential indicator to (from) the selected set. 
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restrict our sample to the post-crisis period 1999-2004. Table 2 shows some descriptive 
statistics on summary accounting information for combined and separate bank groups. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 
3.2. Financial Deterioration Indicator 
The downgrades used in this study are announced by the rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s. This information is obtained from Bankscope Fitch IBCA and FinInfo. 
Table 3 gives details on the downgrades considered in this study. Since several restrictions are 
applied on the construction of the binary dependent variable Y, only a limited number of 
“clean” downgrades are subsequently considered in this study. For example, if several 
downgrades occur during the calendar year, we consider them as a single event. Of the total 
forty-five (45) combined downgrades from the ratings agencies, only twenty (20) “clean” 
downgrades are used for the estimations.  
 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
 
3.3. Accounting Indicators 
We use a set of accounting ratios (see Table 4) commonly used in the assessment of bank 
financial health. These ratios can be grouped into four categories corresponding to the CAEL 
rating categories: Capital, Asset quality, Earnings and Liquidity.  
 
 Following Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi [2006], we consider first order differences of these 
ratios as explanatory variables which seems preferable to the use of ratios in level as Curry, 
Elmer and Fissel [2007], Gunther, Levonian, and Moore [2001. Indeed, we aim to predict 
changes in the financial condition of the bank not its financial condition. More importantly, 
our study requires equal consideration of banks regardless of their initial financial strength. 
More precisely, the downgrade of a sound and safe bank as compared to a modestly 
performing bank can only be captured by a change in the values of the ratios of this bank. 
Consequently, Cji is defined as the annual change in the value of the accounting ratio Rji. 
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Insert Table 4 
 
 
3.4. Market Indicators 
We use weekly equity prices to compute the set of market indicators used in this study. These 
indicators and their expected relationship with the probability of bank failure are presented in 
Table 5.  
The effects of shocks or the presence of abnormal returns can be captured by the variables 
LOGP, RCUM, EXCRCUM, RCUM_NEG, EXCRCUM_NEG and CAR, while we use ∆BETA 
and ∆DD to detect risk changes and changes in the probability of failure, respectively.   
 
 
 
Insert Table 5 
 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
First, we consider the predictive power of the sole accounting indicators via a stepwise 
process. Then, the process is extended to include market indicators. This enables to assess 
their marginal contribution to the prediction process. Dummy variables, to capture possible 
balance sheet structure effects, are also introduced in the model in order to test for the 
stability of the contribution of market indicators.  
 
As a preliminary step, univariate regressions are conducted. Regional results pertain to 
combined groups A and B; while group A pertains to banks from Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Korea and Taiwan; and group B to banks from Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines. For regional estimations, we take into account country group differences by 
introducing a dummy variable GRPB which is equal to one for banks belonging to group B. 
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4.1. Univariate Regression Results 
Table 6 shows the results for the univariate regressions on the accounting and market 
indicators for Asian banks. Results are only reported when the coefficients are at least 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
 
Regional results show that changes in the profitability/earnings ratios NIR_EA and ROAA are 
significant at the 5% level. The negative sign of the coefficients is consistent with the 
expected negative relationship between profitability and bank financial distress. The changes 
in the liquidity ratios NL_DEP and NL_TEA are also significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
But, the negative sign of the coefficients is not consistent with the expected negative 
relationship between liquidity and bank financial distress. For market indicators, EXCRCUM 
and ∆DD are significant at the 5% level. The sign of the coefficient of EXCRCUM is the 
expected one but the sign of the coefficient associated to the change in the distance to default 
∆DD is opposite to the presumed one.4 
For group A, three liquidity indicators, ∆LIQASS_TOTDB, ∆NL_TEA, and ∆NL_DEP, are 
significant at the 5%, 10% and 1% levels respectively but with the wrong signs. Significant 
market indicators are CAR, EXCRCUM, LOGP, RCUM, RCUMNEG and ∆BETA. The 
signs of the coefficients of these indicators all conform to the expected relationship with bank 
financial distress, except for ∆BETA. 
 
Group B results also prove to be interesting showing that the accounting indicators 
∆KP_DEPSTF, ∆KP_LIAB, ∆NL_DEP and ∆ROAA appear as significant. For these banks, 
capital ratios are also meaningful in the prediction process. The sign of the coefficients all 
conform to the expected relationship with bank financial distress except for ∆NL_DEP. 
LOGP, ∆DD and ∆RISK_TOT are the significant market indicators for group B. However, 
                                                 
4
 An explanation for this result may be that, in our sample of banks, the median of the annual change in total 
liabilities is $ 179.84 million for downgraded banks and $ 354.06 for banks with a stable rating or an upgrade. 
Thus, even if the market value of bank equity starts decreasing before the actual downgrade, it is possible that 
the relatively lower increase in the value of debt for downgraded banks is driving the distance to default in the 
opposite direction for these banks. Indeed, the strike price of the Call option used to calculate the distance to 
default is the value of debt. And, a lower strike price implies a lower default probability. 
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only the sign of the coefficient of the variable ∆RISK_TOT is consistent with the expected 
relationship with bank financial distress.  
 
Interestingly, ∆DD, which is the annual change of the distance to default, is a significant 
indicator for the regional and group B results but its coefficient has the wrong sign. 
∆DD_TRIM5 (the quarterly change of the distance to default) was also calculated, eventually 
emerging significant at 10% for group B with a coefficient that has the expected sign. In this 
case, the same variable computed on a different basis behaves inconsistently. The sign of the 
coefficient associated with ∆BETA also exhibits the wrong relationship with bank financial 
distress. The behaviour of these two market indicators is noteworthy at this point. The 
variables seem to show a certain level of sensitivity with respect to the assumptions used in 
the computation particularly with the case of ∆DD. ∆BETA is also a variable that can be 
computed on the basis of several measures.  
 
4.2. Contribution of Accounting Indicators 
After conducting the univariate regressions and initially determining the set of indicators that 
are significant, stepwise procedures are considered. Table 7 is a presentation of the results for 
the stepwise procedure based on the full set of accounting indicators.  
 
 
Insert Table 7 
 
 
For the combined groups A and B, the stepwise results show that earnings ratios are the 
optimal predictors of bank financial distress. ∆NIR_EA and ∆ROAE are significant at the 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. The sign of the coefficients also conform to the expected 
inverse relationship of profitability with bank financial distress. These results are consistent 
with the results of the univariate regressions conducted on the regional set of banks where 
earnings ratios emerge as significant. Also, the dummy variable GRPB, that takes the value of 
one for group B banks, is significant at 5% showing that Group A and Group B banks behave 
differently. 
 
                                                 
5
 ∆DD_TRIM is not retained in the study because interpolated accounting data is needed for the computation of 
this indicator which may bias the results. 
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For group A banks, the stepwise procedure yields earnings (∆NIR_EA) and asset quality 
(∆LLR_TA) indicators as the best predictors of bank financial distress, while it was mostly 
liquidity ratios that emerged as significant in the initial regressions. The signs of the 
coefficients conform to the expected relationship with bank distress. Only one accounting 
indicator emerges after the stepwise procedure for group B banks: ∆ NL_DEP at the 5% 
significance level but with the wrong sign.  
 
4.3. Additional Contribution of Market Indicators 
To determine the set of market indicators that contribute further to the prediction of bank 
distress, the accounting information based model is extended to include market indicators. 
Table 8 shows the results of the stepwise procedure. 
 
 
Insert Table 8 
 
 
The market indicators that significantly add to the predictive power of the accounting 
indicators for the regional set are EXCRCUM and ∆DD which is consistent with the initial 
univariate regression results. These indicators are significant at the 5% and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. The sign of the coefficient of the indicator EXCRCUM conforms 
to the expected relationship with bank financial distress while ∆DD does not.  
 
For group A banks, the market indicators LOGP and ∆BETA increase the predictive power of 
a model based solely on accounting indicators. These indicators are both significant at the 
10% level. The sign of the coefficient of ∆BETA, however, does not conform to the expected 
positive relationship with bank financial distress as can be seen in the univariate regression 
result.  
 
Two market indicators appear to increase the predictive power of the model based only on 
∆NL_DEP for group B banks: CAR and EXCRCUMNEG. However, only the sign of 
EXCRCUMNEG conforms to the expected relationship with bank financial distress.  
The tests at the bottom of the table indicate that, whatever the group of countries, market 
information contribute to the model’s overall fit as we can reject the null hypothesis that 
market indicators are not significant at the 5 % significance level.  
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Therefore our results support the conjecture that the introduction of market indicators in the 
prediction model can add information not yet contained in accounting data. The signs of the 
coefficients associated with these indicators, though, are not always the expected ones.  
 
4.4. Balance sheet structure effects 
 
We study the accuracy of market indicators for different balance sheet profiles. First, we 
consider the structure of assets via the importance of the ratio of net loans to total assets. 
Then, we study the impact of the structure of liabilities on the effectiveness of market 
indicators by considering the importance of the ratio of market funded liabilities to total 
assets. In each case, we consider the impact of the balance sheet structure (assets or liabilities) 
by introducing a dummy variable that takes the value of one for banks with a value of the 
considered ratio higher than the median value of the ratio and zero otherwise. We also run the 
regressions on two sub-samples constructed on the basis of the value of the dummy variable. 
 
The model specification to capture the effects is as follows: 
Prob ( )
1 1 1
1 '
J L L
i i j ji l li l i li
j l l
Y GRPB C M DUM Mα δ β γ γ
= = =
 
= = Φ + + + + 
 
∑ ∑ ∑  
where DUMi is a dummy variable which captures the considered effect.  
 
A test to assess the hypothesis that the considered effect neutralizes the predictive power of 
each market indicator ( 0 : ' 0 1l lH γ γ+ = ∀ ) is conducted.  
Estimations are also conducted on two sub-samples defined on the basis of the value of the 
dummy variable. Due to data limitations, estimations are only run on the regional sample of 
banks (full sample).  
Besides, because the change in the distance to default ∆DD has the wrong sign in our 
estimations we omit this variable in our further investigations6.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 We also ran the estimation with ∆DD and we found the same results. Besides, running the second stepwise 
procedure without ∆DD does not lead to the selection of another significant market indicator. 
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4.4.1 Structure of bank assets 
We study the effectiveness of market indicators depending on the importance of loan 
activities. Indeed, banks focused on loans can be considered as more opaque and the 
effectiveness of market indicators may be weaker for such banks.  
 
Insert Table 9 
 
 
When we introduce the dummy variable DNLTA, we notice that the market indicator 
EXCRCUM is significant only for banks with a high ratio of net loans to total assets, as 
shown by the result of the test at the bottom of table 9. This finding is confirmed when we run 
the regressions on the two sub-samples.  
Thus, market information seems useful only for traditional banks that is for banks highly 
involved in loan activities. However, to check the robustness of this result, we also run the 
stepwise processes separately on the two sub-samples. Results are presented in Table 10. 
 
Insert Table 10 
 
Two market indicators are significant to explain downgrades of banks largely involved in loan 
activities: cumulative market excess returns (EXCRCUM) and the change in specific risk 
(∆RISK_SPEC). These indicators perform as expected. By running the stepwise process on 
the sub-sample of banks with a low ratio of net loans to total assets, two other market 
indicators are selected. Thus, market information seems also useful for such banks. However 
the signs of the coefficient associated with these market indicators are not the expected ones. 
Thus, it seems difficult to interpret market information for such banks. 
  
 4.4.2. Structure of bank liabilities 
The extent to which banks rely on market funding may affect the ability of market agents to 
assess the riskiness of banks. Thus, we study the effectiveness of market indicators depending 
on the importance of the ratio of market funded liabilities to total assets. 
 
Insert Table 11 
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We can see in Table 11, considering both the results obtained with the dummy variable 
DMARKTA or the sub-samples, that the market indicator EXCRCUM is significant only for 
banks with a low ratio of market funded liabilities to total assets.  This result is quite 
surprising. Thus, to check for robustness, we run stepwise processes on the two sub-samples 
defined on the basis of the value of the dummy variable DMARKTA.  
 
Insert Table 12 
 
The results presented in Table 12 show that market information is useful for both types of 
banks but that the effective indicators are not the same. For banks heavily relying on market 
funding, the change in the standard deviation of weekly returns (∆RISK_TOT) and the 
dummy variable that takes into account the existence of negative cumulative market excess 
returns (EXCRCUMNEG) are significant.  For banks with a low ratio of market funded 
liabilities, the significant market variables are the change in the beta (∆BETA) and the 
difference between the natural logarithm of weekly market price and its moving average 
(LOGP). Thus, the structure of liabilities does not seem to affect the effectiveness of market 
information; the accurate market indicators are simply different in both cases. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether equity market information can complete 
accounting information to predict Asian banks’ financial distress. We show that the use of 
equity market indicators can improve the prediction model as they bring additional 
information not already contained in accounting indicators. These results are in line with 
those of Krainer and Lopez [2004] and Curry, Elmer, and Fissel [2007] in the US case, and 
those of Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi [2006] in the European case.  
By dividing our sample of Asian banks into two sub-groups (i.e., banks from the tiger 
economies and banks from emerging markets) we show that the contribution of market 
information to predict banks’ financial distress is significant for both groups. 
The results concerning balance sheet structure effects are less clear-cut. Market information 
appears effective to predict downgrades of banks whatever their structure of liabilities even if 
the accurate indicators are not the same depending on the relative importance of market 
funded liabilities in balance sheets. Concerning assets structure, we find that market indicators 
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are significant to predict downgrades for banks that are either weakly or highly focused on 
loans. However, for banks with a lower extent of loans in their balance sheet, market 
information seems difficult to interpret.  
As a whole, in the case of East Asia, bank stock prices seem to be useful to predict bank 
financial distress but compared to western economies (U.S. and Western Europe) their 
information content appears to be less clear.  
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Figure 1. Definition of the Dependent Variable Y. 
       
Table 1. Distribution of Banks by Country and Specialization 
 
Distribution of banks by country: 
 
 
COUNTRY 
 No. of 
Banks 
Group A:   
 Hong Kong 8 
 Korea 6 
 Singapore 2 
 Taiwan 13 
Group B:   
 Malaysia 3 
 Indonesia 11 
 Thailand 12 
 Philippines 9 
Total  64 
Source: Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
 
Distribution of banks by specialization: 
  
 No. of Banks 
Specialization A and B A B 
Bank holding and holding 
company 
2 2  
Commercial bank 56 24 32 
Cooperative bank 1 1  
Investment bank 5 2 3 
Total 64 29 35 
Source: Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Summary Accounting Information 
Groups A and B: 
 
 
Mean2 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 16447.57 23789.04 162.75 176576.30 
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 52.14 17.87 5.57 94.15 
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 77.37 16.38 0.00 93.51 
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets (%) 1.69 1.66 0.00 6.79 
Deposits (in million USD) 13142.94 18174.79 0.00 126694.20 
Subordinated Debt (in million USD) 397.86 750.03 0.00 6014.69 
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 12.70 13.72 4.60 24.80 
ROA (%) 0.78 1.88 -12.13 12.79 
1
 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2
 Each mean is calculated as ∑∑
==
=
N
j
jt
T
t
X
NT
X
11
1
 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of 
financial reports. Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
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Group A: 
 
 
Mean2 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 26462.82 31953.78 271.40 176576.30 
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 59.35 15.40 5.57 80.42 
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 78.29 18.26 4.52 93.51 
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets (%) 2.10 1.45 0.00 5.63 
Deposits (in million USD) 20984.88 24062.07 54.62 126694.20 
Subordinated Debt (in million USD) 811.40 1122.54 0.00 6014.69 
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 13.72 18.49 4.60 20.30 
ROA (%) 0.48 1.13 -5.53 4.24 
1
 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2
 Each mean is calculated as ∑∑
==
=
N
j
jt
T
t
X
NT
X
11
1
 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of 
financial reports. Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
 
Group B: 
 
 
Mean2 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 8518.84 8151.21 162.75 36006.70 
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 46.43 17.66 8.19 94.15 
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 76.64 14.74 0.00 92.59 
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets 
(%) 
1.49 1.73 0.00 6.79 
Deposits (in million USD) 6934.73 6928.68 0.00 30802.41 
Subordinated Debt (in million 
USD) 
188.26 289.38 0.00 1089.29 
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 11.58 4.70 5.20 24.80 
ROA (%) 1.02 2.28 -12.13 12.79 
1
 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2
 Each mean is calculated as ∑∑
==
=
N
j
jt
T
t
X
NT
X
11
1
 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of 
financial reports. Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
 
 
Table 3. Downgrades Information 
(Number of clean downgrades in parenthesis)   
 
Groups A and B: 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
45 (20) Total downgrades 18 (6) 9 (7) 1 (1) 3 (1) 14 (5) 
4 (1) Downgrades by Standard and 
Poor’s 
  
3 (0) 
 
1 (1)  
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
 
0 (0) 
21 (13) Downgrades by Fitch 5 (3) 8 (6) 1 (1) 0 (0) 7 (3) 
20 (6) Downgrades by Moody’s 10 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (1) 7 (2) 
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Group A: 
  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
21 (13) Total downgrades 9 (4)  9 (7) 1 (1) 0 (0) 2 (1) 
1 (1) Downgrades by Standard and 
Poor’s 
0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 
14 (11) Downgrades by Fitch 5 (3) 8 (6) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
6 (2) Downgrades by Moody’s 4 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 
 
 
Group B: 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
24 (7) Total downgrades 9 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (1) 12 (4) 
3 (0) Downgrades by Standard and 
Poor’s 
3 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
7 (3) Downgrades by Fitch 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (3) 
14 (4) Downgrades by Moody’s 6 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (1) 5 (1) 
Source: Bankscope Fitch IBCA and FinInfo 
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Table 4. Accounting Ratios Rj 
Category Name Definitions 
Capital 
KP_NL Equity/ Net Loans 
KP_DEPSTF Equity/ Customer and ST Fundings 
KP_LIAB Equity/ Liabilities 
TCR Total Capital Ratio 
Asset 
Quality 
LLP_TA Loan Loss Provision/ Total Assets 
LLP_GL Loan Loss Provision/ Gross Loans 
RWA_TA7 Risk-weighted Assets and Off-balance Sheet Risks 
(inferred from the Cooke ratio)/ Total Assets 
LLR_TA Loan Loss Reserves/ Total Assets 
LLR_GL Loan Loss Reserves/ Gross Loans 
Earnings 
LLP_NETIR Loan Loss Provision/ Net Interest Revenue 
NIR_NINC Net Interest Revenue/ Net Income 
NIR_EA Net Interest Revenue/ Total Earning Assets 
ROAA Return on Assets = Net Income/ Total Assets 
ROAE Return on Equity = Net Income/ Equity 
Liquidity 
INTERBK Interbank Assets/ Interbank Liabilities 
LIQASS_TOTDB Liquid Assets/ Total Deposits and Borrowings 
NL_DEP Net Loans/ Customer and ST Fundings 
NL_TEA Net Loans/ Total Earning Assets 
TRAD_OPINC (Trading Income-Trading Expense)/ Operating Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 This ratio is obtained by dividing the denominator of the Cooke ratio by total assets. Note that if we were to 
omit off-balance sheet risks the value of this ratio would range from 0 (lowest possible level of asset risk) to 1 
(highest possible level of asset risk). Because the Cooke ratio also accounts for off-balance sheet risks, the value 
of this indicator can be larger than 1, indicating an even higher exposure to risk. 
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Table 5. Market Indicators  
Indicators 
 
Definition 
Expected sign of the 
coefficient 
LOGP  Difference between the natural logarithm of weekly market price and its moving average calculated on one year. Negative 
 RCUM 
Cumulative return: ( )13
, 1
1
1 1bt b t k
k
RCUM r
− +
=
= + −
  
  
  
∏ with rb,t+1 = , 1 , ,( /)b t b t b tP P P+ −  where rbt is the weekly 
return of the stock b;  we calculate this cumulative return on the fourth quarter of the accounting period 
(financial year) preceding the event, Pbt is the weekly stock price of bank b. 
Negative 
 RCUMNEG Dummy variable equal to one if the cumulative return is negative in the two last quarters of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event, and zero otherwise. Positive 
EXCRCUM 
Cumulative market excess return: ( ) ( )13 13, , 1 , 1
1 1
1 1 1 1b t b t k m t k
k k
EXCRCUM r r
− + − +
= =
      
      
               
= + − − + −∏ ∏
 
We obtain rm, the weekly market return, which we calculate from the country-specific market index, from 
Datastream International for the fourth quarter of the financial exercise preceding the event. 
Negative 
EXCRCUMNEG Dummy variable equal to one if the cumulative market excess return is negative in the two last quarters of the 
accounting period (financial year) preceding the event, and zero otherwise. Positive 
 CAR 
Cumulative abnormal returns on the fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the 
event: RACbt= 
13
, 1
1
b t k
k
RA
− +
=
∑  with RAbt=Rbt-( ˆˆ mtRα β+ ). We estimate the market model on the third quarter of 
the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event   
Negative 
∆RISK_TOT Change in the standard deviation of weekly returns between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. Positive 
 ∆BETA Change in the market model beta ( ˆˆˆ mtbt RR α β+= ) between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting 
period (financial year) preceding the event 
Positive 
 ∆RISK_SPEC Change in specific risk: standard deviation of the market model residual between the third and fourth quarter 
of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. Positive 
 ∆Z 
Change in the Z-score between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding 
the event with: Z= ( )1 /b rr σ+   where br is the mean return of stock b on the preceding quarter and rσ  the 
standard deviation of the return.  
Negative 
 ∆DD 
Annual change in the distance to default estimated at the end of the accounting period (financial year) 
preceding the event. We infer the distance to default from the market value of a risky debt (Merton (1977)) 
based on the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing formula (see Appendix).  
Negative 
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Table 6. Financial Deterioration and Early Indicators: Univariate Regressions 
 
Model Specification:  Prob { } ( )ii XY βα +Φ== 1 , for Groups A and B 
Prob { } ( )1i i iY GRPB Xα δ β= = Φ + + , for Regional 
 
   Regional Grp A Grp B 
A
cco
u
nting
 Indicato
rs
 
Earnings 
 
∆NIR_EA 
  
-0.5783 ** -1.1414 *     
2.1516   -1.8172       
Earnings 
  
∆ROAA 
  
-0.1183 **     -0.0889 ** 
-2.0399       -2.1900   
Liquidity 
  
∆NL_DEP 
  
-0.0686 *** -0.1105 *** -0.0512 ** 
-3.0984   -2.5313   -2.4117   
Liquidity 
  
∆NL_TEA 
  
-0.0293 ** -0.0794 *     
-1.9355   -1.6703       
Liquidity 
  
∆LIQASS_TOTDB 
  
    0.0466 **     
    2.0615       
Capital 
  
∆KP_DEPSTF 
  
        -0.0628 * 
        -1.8405   
Capital 
  
∆KP_LIAB 
  
        -0.0902 ** 
        -2.0113   
M
a
rk
et
 Indicato
rs
 
  EXCRCUM 
  
-37.1165 ** -75.4909 ***     
  2.3148   -2.6605       
  ∆DD 
  
0.5853 **     0.7156 * 
  1.9898       1.8449   
  CAR 
  
    -2.2359 **     
      -2.0397       
  LOGP 
  
    -4.5224 *** 1.8601 ** 
      -2.6669   2.3191   
  RCUM 
  
    -43.6537 *     
      -1.7512       
  RCUMNEG 
  
    1.3218 **     
      2.1266       
  ∆BETA 
  
    -2.9976 *     
      -1.7018       
  ∆RISK_TOT 
  
        64.0651 * 
          1.8185   
This table shows simple logit estimation results where the dependent variable is separately regressed on each 
explanatory variable and a constant. For regional estimations, a dummy variable (GRPB), which is equal to 1, if 
the bank belongs to group B; and 0, otherwise, is added. This model explains downgrades (whatever their 
extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** 
and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. 
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Table 7. Financial Deterioration and Early Indicators: Stepwise Results – Accounting 
Indicators 
Model Specification:  Prob { } 






+Φ== ∑
=
J
j
jiji CY
1
1 βα , for Groups  A and B 
Prob { }
1
1
J
i i j ji
j
Y GRPB Cα δ β
=
 
= = Φ + + 
 
∑ , for Regional 
  Regional Grp A Grp B 
Constant 
  
  -1.8368 *** -1.7837 *** -3.1393 *** 
  -6.2013   -5.4857   -6.8583   
GRPB 
  
  -0.9708 **         
  -1.928           
Earnings 
  
∆NIR_EA 
  
-0.6261 ** -1.5751 **     
-2.1678   -2.0533       
Earnings 
  
∆ROAE 
  
-0.0092 *         
-1.7313           
Asset Quality 
  
∆LLR_TA 
  
    1.2584 **     
    2.058       
Liquidity 
  
∆NL_DEP 
  
        -0.0512 ** 
        -2.4116   
McFadden R2   0.079   0.075   0.030   
Total Observations   231   88   120   
# of observations with 
Y=1   20   13   5   
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process. For regional estimations, a dummy 
variable (GRPB), which is equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group B; and 0, otherwise, is added. 
This model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. 
Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The number of observations in the 
regional model is not equal to the sum of the number of observations of Group A and Group B 
models because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator. 
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Table 8. Financial Deterioration and Early Indicators: Stepwise Results – With Market 
Indicators 
Model Specification: Prob { } 






++Φ== ∑∑
==
L
l
lil
J
j
jiji MCY
11
1 γβα , for Groups A and B 
Prob { }
1 1
1
J L
i i j ji l li
j l
Y GRPB C Mα δ β γ
= =
 
= = Φ + + + 
 
∑ ∑ , for Regional 
 
 
  Regional Grp A Grp B 
Constant 
  
  -2.0372 *** 1.7677 *** -4.4172 *** 
  -5.3066   -4.8999   -4.1608   
GRPB 
  
  -1.1066 **         
  -2.1054           
Earnings 
  
∆NIR_EA 
  
-0.6024 ** -2.8627       
-1.9934   -1.4758       
Earnings 
  
∆ROAE 
  
-0.0215 **         
-2.1702           
Asset Quality 
  
∆LLR_TA 
  
    1.8636 *     
    1.7217       
Liquidity 
  
∆NL_DEP 
  
        -0.1062 *** 
        -2.8877   
  
  
  
  
 Market Indicators 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
EXCRCUM 
  
-37.1166 **         
-2.1353           
∆DD 
  
0.7621 ***         
2.5579           
LOGP 
  
    -4.6914 **     
    -2.3038       
∆BETA 
  
    -7.9047 **     
    -1.9322       
CAR 
  
        7.3578 *** 
        2.9005   
EXCRCUMNEG 
  
        2.0263 * 
        1.6743   
Risk level to reject γl = 0 
∀ l  1.27%**  1.95%**  1.21%**  
McFadden R2   0.163   0.28   0.185   
Total Observations   187   85   107   
# of observations with 
Y=1   20   13   5   
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant, the accounting 
indicators previously selected and the market indicators selected by the stepwise process. For regional 
estimations, a dummy variable (GRPB), which is equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group B; and 0, otherwise, is 
added. This model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, 
respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The number of observations in the regional model is not equal to the sum of 
the number of observations of Group A and Group B models because all data are not available for each bank, 
each year and each indicator. 
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Table 9 Market Indicators and the structure of assets  
Model Specification:  
Prob { } ( )
1 1 1
1 '
J L L
i i j ji l li l i li
j l l
Y GRPB C M DNLTA Mα δ β γ γ
= = =
 
= = Φ + + + + × 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ,  for the whole 
sample 
Prob { }
1 1
1
J L
i i j ji l li
j l
Y GRPB C Mα δ β γ
= =
 
= = Φ + + + 
 
∑ ∑ , for sub-samples 
 Whole sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 
Constant 
  
-2.038 *** -1.815 *** -2.752 *** 
-6.465  -4.289  -3.953  
GRPB 
  
-0.725 
 -2.176 ** 0.542  
-1.449  -1.975  0.661  
∆NIR_EA 
  
-0.579 
 
-1.576  -0.337 
 
-1.610  -1.312  -1.426  
∆ROAE 
  
-0.012 
 
-0.018  -0.003  
-1.532  -0.951  -0.446  
EXCRCUM 
  
17.268 
 -51.915 ** 22.734  
0.590  -1.984  0.873  
EXCRCUM*DNLTA 
  
-75.609 **     
-2.127      
McFadden R2 0.143  0.311  0.038  
Total Observations 213  111  102  
# of observations with 
Y=1 20  12  8  
Risk level to reject γ1 +  
γ'1 = 0 0.36%      
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant, 
the accounting indicators and the market indicators selected by the stepwise processes and a 
dummy variable (GRPB) equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group B; 0, otherwise. This model 
explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Assets structure 
effect is taken into account in the first column with the dummy variable DNLTA associated with 
market indicators. DNLTA is equal to 1, if the ratio net loans/ total assets is higher than its median 
value (54.72%). Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain 
to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. Sub-sample 1 includes 
banks for which DNLTA=1, while sub-sample 2 includes banks for which DNLTA=0. 
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Table 10 Market Indicators and the structure of assets: new stepwise8  
Model Specification:  
Prob { }
1 1
1
J L
i i j ji l li
j l
Y GRPB C Mα δ β γ
= =
 
= = Φ + + + 
 
∑ ∑ , for sub-samples 
 
 Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 
Constant 
  
-1.691 *** -2.758 *** 
-3.471  -3.722  
GRPB 
  
-5.210 *** 0.596  
-3.113  0.663  
∆NIR_EA 
  
-1.904  
  
-1.622    
∆KP_DEPSTF 
  
-0.343 *   
-1.792    
∆LLR_GL 
  
0.245    
1.040    
∆KP_LIAB 
  
  -0.032  
  -1.135  
EXCRCUM 
  
-97.392 ***   
-2.597    
∆RISKSPEC 
  
172.47 *   
1.838    
RCUMNEG 
  
  -1.810 ** 
  -2.519  
∆Z 
  
  0.136 * 
  1.785  
McFadden R2 0.468  0.112  
Total Observations 110  103  
# of observations 
with Y=1 12  8  
χ
2
 stats for γl = 0 
∀ l 6.91**  10.73***   
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant, 
the accounting indicators selected by a first stepwise process and the market indicators selected by 
a second stepwise process and a dummy variable (GRPB) equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group 
B; 0, otherwise. This model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next 
calendar year. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain 
to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. Sub-sample 1 includes 
banks for which DNLTA=1, while sub-sample 2 includes banks for which DNLTA=0. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 We run two stepwise procedures: one with the accounting indicators and the other one adding market 
indicators. In these stepwise procedures, we make sure that at least 75% of the observations with Y=1 are 
considered in the regressions. Here, we only report the results obtained at the end of the second procedure. 
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Table 11 Market Indicators and the structure of liabilities  
Model Specification:  
Prob { } ( )
1 1 1
1 '
J L L
i i j ji l li l i li
j l l
Y GRPB C M DMARKTA Mα δ β γ γ
= = =
 
= = Φ + + + + × 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ,  for the 
whole sample 
Prob { }
1 1
1
J L
i i j ji l li
j l
Y GRPB C Mα δ β γ
= =
 
= = Φ + + + 
 
∑ ∑ , for sub-samples 
 Whole sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 
Constant 
  
-1.891 *** -3.247 *** -1.388 *** 
-6.219  -4.122  -3.672  
GRPB 
  
-0.938 * 1.066  -2.759 ** 
-1.757  1.092  -2.291  
∆NIR_EA 
  
-0.587 * -0.562  -0.546  
-1.753  -1.465  -0.996  
∆ROAE 
  
-0.012  -0.045 ** -0.009  
-1.547  -2.028  -0.502  
EXCRCUM 
  
-37.005 * -7.830  -39.211*  
-1.869  -0.278  -1.695   
EXCRCUM*DMARKTA 
  
14.961       
0.478       
McFadden R2 0.111  0.083  0.257   
Total Observations 213  109  104   
# of observations with 
Y=1 20  8  12   
Risk level to reject γ1 +  
γ'1 = 0 37.44%       
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant, 
the accounting indicators and the market indicators selected by the stepwise processes and a 
dummy variable (GRPB) equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group B; 0, otherwise. This model 
explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Assets structure  
effect is taken into account in the first column with the dummy variable DNLTA associated with 
market indicators. DMARKTA is equal to 1, if the ratio Market fundings/ total assets is higher 
than its median value (9.88%). Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, 
** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. Sub-
sample 1 includes banks for which DMARKTA=1, while sub-sample 2 includes banks for which 
DMARKTA=0. 
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Table 12 Market Indicators and the structure of liabilities: new stepwise9  
Model Specification:  
Prob { }
1 1
1
J L
i i j ji l li
j l
Y GRPB C Mα δ β γ
= =
 
= = Φ + + + 
 
∑ ∑ , for sub-samples 
 
 Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 
Constant 
  
-3.966 *** -1.324 *** 
-5.650  -3.726  
GRPB 
  
1.007  -3.025 ** 
1.153  -2.296  
∆NIR_EA 
  
  -1.371 * 
  -1.877  
∆KP_LIAB 
  
-0.093**    
-2.317    
∆ROAE 
  
-0.024    
-1.371    
∆BETA 
  
  -5.774 ** 
  -2.226  
LOGP 
  
  -3.080 * 
  -1.701   
∆RISKTOT 
  
97.804 ***   
2.653    
EXCRCUMNEG 
  
1.648 *   
1.911    
McFadden R2 0.175  0.314   
Total Observations 110  102   
# of observations 
with Y=1 8  12   
χ
2
 stats for γl = 0 
∀ l 7.80**  9.64**   
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant, 
the accounting indicators selected by a first stepwise process and the market indicators selected by 
a second stepwise process and a dummy variable (GRPB) equal to 1, if the bank belongs to group 
B; 0, otherwise. This model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next 
calendar year. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain 
to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. Sub-sample 1 includes 
banks for which DMARKTA=1, while sub-sample 2 includes banks for which DMARKTA=0. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 We run two stepwise procedures: one with the accounting indicators and the other one adding market 
indicators. In these stepwise procedures, we make sure that at least 75% of the observations with Y=1 are 
considered in the regressions. Here, we only report the results obtained at the end of the second procedure. 
  28
APPENDIX: DISTANCE TO DEFAULT 
 
The distance to default indicator DD - the number of standard deviations away from the 
default point (i.e., when the value of assets equals the value of liabilities) - is: 
 
 
T
Tr
D
V
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t
t
f
t
t
t
σ
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







−+





=
2
log
2
      
where:  
Vt = bank's asset value at time t 
Dt = book value at time t of the bank's debt of maturity T 
T = debt maturity  
rf   = risk-free interest rate 
σt = bank's asset value volatility 
 
To estimate Vt and σt, the value of equity as a call option on the underlying assets with a 
strike price equal to the book value of the bank's debt was considered. Hence, the market 
value and volatility of the bank's underlying assets can be derived from the equity's market 
value (VE) and volatility (σE) by solving: 
)1(
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Weekly market values of the bank's equity (VE) were obtained from Datastream. The 
volatility of the bank's equity (σE) on the quarter preceding the end of the calendar year was 
calculated as the standard deviation of weekly equity returns multiplied by 365 .  
 
Here, the expiry date of the option (T) is equal to the maturity of the debt. A common 
assumption is to set it to one, i.e., one year. Interbank rates from Datastream were used to 
compute risk-free rates. Data on debt liabilities were obtained from Bankscope. The total 
amount of liabilities was calculated as the total amount of deposits, money-market funding, 
bonds, subordinated debt and hybrid capital. 
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